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PREFACE 
The main theme o f  t h i s  paper  i s  t h a t  Nash E q u i l i b r i a  
of games w i t h  smooth payoff  f u n c t i o n s  g e n e r a l l y  t e n d  t o  
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INEFFICIENCY OF NASH EQUILIBRIA 
BY 
PRADEEP DUBEY 
1. I n t r o d u c t i o n .  The main theme of t h i s  paper  i s  t h a t  Nash E q u i l i b r i a  
(N.E.) of games w i t h  smooth payoff f u n c t i o n s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  P a r e t o - i n e f f i c i e n t .  
Suppose t h a t  a  s t r a t e g i c  game w i t h  n  p l a y e r s  is  g i v e n  by n  maps 
i i i = 1 ,..., n  , where S  i s  t h e  s t r a t e g y - s e t  and u  t h e  payoff f u n c t i o n  
i 
of p l a y e r  i . Our r e s u l t  s t a t e s  t h a t  i f  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  u  a r e  c2 , t h e n  
g e n e r i c a l l y  ( f o r  an open dense  s e t  o f  p a y o f f s ) :  ( a )  t h e  set of N.E. i s  
f i n i t e ,  (b) i f  an  N.E.  i s  e f f i c i e n t ,  t h e n  a t  l e a s t  one p l a y e r  i s  on a  v e r t e x  
of h i s  s t r a t e g y - s e t ,  ( c )  i f  a n  N.E. i s  s t r o n g ,  t h e n  a t  most one p l a y e r  is  
of f  a  v e r t e x  of h i s  s t r a t e g y - s e t .  Note t h a t  (b )  i m p l i e s  g e n e r i c  i n e f f i c i e n c y  
i f  t h e  s t r a t e g y - s e t s  a r e  v e r t e x - f r e e  ( e . g . ,  mani fo lds )  o r  i f  v e r t i c e s  can 
a  p r i o r i  b e  r u l e d  o u t  of N.E. i n  t h e  g i v e n  case .  The r e s u l t  a p p l i e s  t o  t h e  
mul t i -matr ix  games of Nash ( s e c t i o n  4 ) .  Here a  v e r t e x  corresponds t o  a  
p u r e  s t r a t e g y  and, g i v e n  t h e  s p e c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  of payoff f u n c t i o n s ,  ( c )  
can b e  s t r e n t h e n e d  t o :  i f  an  N.E. is  s t r o n g  every  p l a y e r  is  us ing  a  p u r e  
s t r a t e g y .  
That t h e  outcome of noncoopera t ion  (N.E.) i s  g e n e r a l l y  incompat ib le  
w i t h  c o o p e r a t i o n  ( e f f i c i e n c y )  has  been p a r t  of t h e  " f o l k l o r e "  of Game 
Theory a s  exempl i f i ed  i n  t h e  paradigm of t h e  " P r i s o n e r ' s  ~ i l e m m a " .  The pur- 
pose  of t h e  paper  i s  t o  p u t  t h i s  on a  r i g o r o u s  f o o t i n g .  
Th is  paper is  a  r e w r i t e  of an  o l d  v e r s i o n  [ 2 ]  . It  i s  a  p l e a s u r e  t o  
thank J.3. Rogawski f o r  s e v e r a l  comments, and i n  p a r t i c u l a r  f o r  t h e  example 
i n  s e c t i o n  3,  which is  due i n  i ts  e n t i r e t y  t o  him. 
2. The Main Theorem 
i k ( i )  
L e t  N = {l , .. . , n )  , n  2 2 , b e  t h e  s e t  o f  p l a y e r s ,  and S  C R 9 
i k ( i )  2 1  , t h e  s t r a t e g y - s e t  of p l a y e r  i . Here S  i s  t h e  u n i t  s implex ,  
i k ( i )  k(i)  : z x; i . e . ,  S  = {x e R, 1 . (For  more g e n e r a l  s t r a t e g y - s e t s ,  
1~ j =1 J 1 n  
s e e  Remark 1. ) F i x  neighborhoods vi of si and p u t  V = V x.  . . x V . 
Let  U b e  t h e  l i n e a r  s p a c e  of a l l  c2 f u n c t i o n s  from V t o  t h e  r e a l s  
2  1 > 
endowed w i t h  t h e  C -norm, i . e . ,  f o r  a l l  u  i n  U , 
2  
llull = supill u(s)ll , I I~u(s ) l l  , I I D  u(s)ll : s V) . Our s p a c e  of noncoopera- 
1  i 
t i v e  games w i l l  b e  ( u ) ~  ; f o r  any u  = (u  , . . . , un) a ( u ) ~  , u  i s  t h e  
payoff f u n c t i o n  of p l a y e r  i . 
i 1 n  For  any s = {s  : i ~ N ) Q S  = S x...x S , T C N  , and 
i 
e  = {e : i c T )  E X si , l e t  (sic) denote  t h e  e lement  of S  o b t a i n e d  
i a  T  i i from s by r e p l a c i n g  s by e  f o r  each  i T . 
1 Assume u  = (u , . . . , , u n )  6 (u)" is  f i x e d .  A p o i n t  s 6 S i s  c a l l e d  
i (1) T - e f f i c i e n t  i f  t h e r e  does n o t  e x i s t  any p o i n t  e  E X S such  t h a t  
i6T 
u i ( s / e )  2 u i ( s )  f o r  a l l  i e T  
u j  (S ( e )  > u j  (s)  f o r  some j g T 
(2)  a  Nash Equi l ib r ium (R.E.) i f  i t  i s  T - e f f i c i e n t  f o r  a l l  s u b s e t s  T  
c o n s i s t i n g  of one element 
( 3 )  e f f i c i e n t  i f  i t  is  T - e f f i c i e n t  f o r  T  = N 
( 4 )  a  s t r o n s  Nash E q u i l i b r i u m  i f  i t  i s  T - e f f i c i e n t  f o r  a l l  s u b s e t s  
T C N .  
1 > i . e . ,  i t  i s  r e q u i r e d  t h a t  t h e  norm llull of  u  be f i n i t e  i n  o r d e r  t h a t  
u €  U . (The c a s e  when u  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  b e  d e f i n e d  o n l y  on S  is  
more n a t u r a l ,  b u t  w i l l  f o l l o w  from t h e  c u r r e n t  case--see Remark 2 . )  
Let N(u) , E(u) , G(u) denote  t he  s e t s  of Nash, e f f i c i e n t ,  s t r o n g  Nash 
p o i n t s  of t h e  game u . 
Theorem There i s  an open dense set Uo of (u)" such t h a t ,  f o r  u  U : 
0 
(a)  N(u) is  a f i n i t e  set 
1 (b)  i f  s = ( s  , . . . , s n )  N(u) fl E(u) , then a t  l e a s t  one s j  i s  a 
v e r t e x  
1 (c)  i f  s = (S , . . . , sn)  E G (u) , then  a t  most one si i s  no t  a  ve r t ex .  
i Proof F i r s t  w e  focus on t h e  ca se  when s i s  i n  t h e  i n t e r i o r  of 
i S ( 1  , ,  n)  . Let  r ( j )  = C k ( i )  . Then V may be  viewed a s  a  
i<j 
pr(n) of dimension r (n) . For s u b s e t  of t h e  Eucl idean space L. 
1 
s = (S , . . . , s n )  E V , s1 g ives  t h e  f i r s t  k (1)  coord ina tes  of s , s 2 
t h e  next  k (2)  coo rd ina t e s ,  i . e . ,  t h e  coord ina tes  from r ( 1 )  + 1 till  
r ( 2 )  , e t c .  Consider t h e  d e r i v a t i v e  map 
given by : 
1 n 
where u = (u , ,  u ) . For f i x e d  u , 
i s  t h e  map obta ined  by r e s t r i c t i n g  D : 
W e  d e f i n e  two s u b s e t s  of RnXr (n)  t h a t  h e l p  i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of N(u) , 
E(u) , G(u) . 
N* = {A € R n x r ( n >  . Aij  = 0 f o r  r ( i - 1 )  + 1 < j < r ( i ) }  , 
where j denotes  t h e  e n t r y  i n  t h e  ith row and jth column of m a t r i x  
* 
A ,  i . e . ,  A E N  i f  i t  has  t h e  form 
1 n It is c l e a r ,  s i n c e  s E I n t  S x . . . x  I n t  S ( I n t  - i n t e r i o r )  , t h a t  
-8- 
Also d e f i n e  E" = {A R nxr(n) : t h e  rows of A a r e  l i n e a r l y  dependent} . 
Then, a s  po in t ed  o u t  by Smale i n  [ 5 ]  ( s e e  Appendix) : 
( i i )  s r ~ ( u )  * s e D - ~  (E*) . 
u 
From ( i )  and ( i i ) ,  we have 
-1 (N* E I )  ( i i i )  s q N ( u )  n E ( u ) * s 6 D U  
J. nxr  (n) One can e a s i l y  check t h a t  N is  a submanifold o f  R of codimension 
<< 3. -1. 
r ( n )  ; and N n E* i s  a f i n i t e  union of  submanif o l d s  H1 ,...., H of 
P 
Rnxr (n )  each of which has  codimension r ( n )  + 1 
1 F i x  compact s e t s  1 , . . . , - vn such  t h a t  si C I n t  - vi C vi . Let  M 
be any submanifold  of R ~ ~ ~ ( ~ )  . ~e c l a i m  
(a)  There  is  an  open, dense  s e t  u~ of (u)" such  t h a t ,  i f  u  UM , 
1 n 
t h e n  DU is  t r a n s v e r s e  t o  M a t  every  x i n  1 = - V x. . .x  V . 
- 
(*) w i l l  f o l l o w  from t h e  T r a n s v e r a l  Densi ty  and Openness Theorems ( s e e  
Appendix) i f  we can show: 
( *  D is  t r a n v e r s e  t o  M a t  every  x  V . 
Let  y  be  a n  a r b i t r a r y  v e c t o r  i n  RnXr(") and c o n s i d e r  any 
1 
(uo , s o )  E ( u ) ~  X V . Cons t ruc t  t h e  smooth p a t h  (ut  Y s t )  1 t=o i n  
( u ) ~  x v a s  f o l l o w s :  
r=r (n )  i i 
u t (x) = U  o (x) + B t y i j x  
j=1 j 
Then 
d There fore  - v e r i f y i n g 1 )  ( * A ) ,  and hence (*) . d t  
t = O  
Consider  t h e  open dense  s e t s  UN* , UHA ,..., UH1 given  by (*) f o r  t h e  
1 P 
That t h e  i n v e r s e  image of D s p l i t s  f o l l o w s  t r i v i a l l y  from t h e  
f i n i t e - d i m e n s i o n a l i t y  of t h e  range .  
-1. k A f i  
submanifolds  N , H1 , HP . Put  U = uN* uH1 17 ... n U . Then 5 
U* is  a l s o  open dense  i n  (u)" . Moreover i t  f o l l o w s  from (*) t h a t ,  f o r  
- 1 7'c 
codim 
DU 
(N*) = codim N = r ( n )  
-1 * 7'c 
codim D (H.) = codim H .  > r ( n )  
U J  J  
* 
But dim V = r ( n )  , hence dim D - l  (N ) is  z e r o  , i . e .  , D-I (N*) i s  a 
U U 
A 
d i s c r e t e  set .  Then S n D i l  (N ) must b e  f i n i t e  s i n c e  S i s  compact. 
f i  ?: 
By ( i )  , N(u) C (S n D-' (N ) )  , s o  N(u) i s  a l s o  f i n i t e  ( f o r  u  e U ) . U 
* 
Next c o n s i d e r  t h a t  t h e  set N(u! n E(u) f o r  u  E U . By ( i i i )  , i t  
P * -1 " 
i s  con ta ined  i n  U D - l  (Hj) . But codim D (Hj) > r ( n )  = dim V , U U j = 1 
-1 '" 
s o  t h e  sets DU (H;) a r e  empty. Th is  conc ludes  t h e  proof of t h e  theorem 
1 n f o r  s I n t  S  x.. . x  I n t  S  . 
1 I n  g e n e r a l ,  t a k e  any s = ( s  , . . . , sn)  S  . Go through t h e  same 
i i 
argument r e p l a c i n g  S by t h e  f a c e  of si which c o n t a i n s  s i n  i t s  
i 
r e l a t i v e  i n t e r i o r .  I f ,  f o r  some s u b s e t  R C N , t h e  s a r e  v e r t i c e s  f o r  
i R , t h e n  l o o k  a t  t h e  subgame among t h e  remaining p l a y e r s  i n  T = N \ R . 
The argument shows t h a t  f o r  an  open dense  set o f  p a y o f f s ,  i f  s i s  a n  
N.E. of t h e  subgame, t h e n  i t  i s  n o t  T - e f f i c i e n t  (and,  a l s o ,  t h a t  such  N.E. 
a r e  f i n i t e  i n  number). L e t  Uo b e  t h e  f i n i t e  i n t e r s e c t i o n  of a l l  t h e s e  
open dense  sets. 
Q.E.D. 
Remarks 
(1) We took s t r a t e g y - s e t s  t o  be  s imp l i ce s  because they  occu r  f o r  many 
c l a s s e s  of games ( s e e ,  e . g . ,  [ 4 ]  , [ 6 ]  t h a t  have t r a d i t i o n a l l y  been 
i 
examined. But ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  S could be  a  f i n i t e  union of sub- 
manifolds  of some Euc l idean  space  (con ta ined  i n  a compact r e g i o n ) .  
The theorem c l e a r l y  ho ld s .  (A v e r t e x  would now mean a zero-dimensional 
p i e c e  i n  t h i s  un ion ,  when t h e  union is expressed  min imal ly . )  
(2)  Def ine  a  f u n c t i o n  u  : S - R t o  be  c2 i f  i t  can be  extended t o  
a C* f u n c t i o n  on some neighborhood of  S . Let  - O b e  t h e  space  of 
2  
a l l  C f u n c t i o n s  on S endowed w i t h  t h e  norm 
It is  more n a t u r a l  t o  cons ide r  ( u ) ~  , r a t h e r  t han  (u)" , t o  be  t h e  
space  of games. However, o u r  theorem ho ld s  f o r  ( I ) ~  a l s o .  For any 
u  6 (u)" l e t  u  be t h e  member of (gin ob t a ined  by r e s t r i c t i n g  
u  from V t o  S . F i r s t  n o t e  t h a t  
( i v )  l l  ull < E * l l  urIl < E 
I1  Also,  i t  is  w e l l  known that- - i f  t h e  si a r e  nice"  s e t s ,  e . g . ,  
s i m p l i c e s ,  spheres-- 
(v)  There e x i s t s  a  K > 0 such t h a t :  f o r  any - u (LJn wi th  
lll?lls < E , we can f i n d  a u E (u)" w i t h  lluil < K E and ur = - u . 
By ( i v )  and ( v ) ,  i f  Uo is  open dense i n  ( u ) ~  , then  s o  is  
u = Cu 
- o r 
: u ( u0} i n  (1)" . 
- 
( 3 )  Let  U b e  any submanifold  of (u)" which s a t i s f i e s  t h e  fo l lowing  
t r a n s v e r s a l i t y  cond i t i on :  
- 
(T.C.) The map U x V D Rnxr(n)  i s  t r a n s v e r s e  t o  every 
nxr  (n)  
submanifold of R 
- 
Then, c l e a r l y ,  ou r  theorem ho ld s  w i t h  U i n  p l a c e  of ( u ) ~  . I f  
-1 - n c i  U = U x. . .x  U and each has  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p r o p e r t y :  
(T.C.)* f o r  any y  E R  r (n )  and x  E V , t h e r e  is a smooth p a t h  u  t 
fii i n  d  , O <  t < 1  , such t h a t  
-(D(ut,x) = y d t  
- 
then  U w i l l  s a t i s f y  t h e  T.C. c o n d i t i o n .  T h e n e x t  two s e c t i o n s  
p r o v i d e  i n s t a n c e s  of t h i s .  
(4 )  Consider  t h e  set 1 Uc of (U , . . . , un) f o r  which each 
i i given  by u s ( t )  = u ( s  1 t )  i s  s t r i c t l y  concave.  Then Uc i s  open i n  
(u)" . A s  is  well-known N(u) # @ i f  u  6 Uc . T h i s  shows t h a t  o u r  
r e s u l t  is n o t  vacuous.  
3.  An Example 
We p r e s e n t  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  example because  i t  is p a r t i c u l a r l y  s i m p l e  
and i l l u s t r a t e s  a l l  of t h e  f e a t u r e s  of t h e  g e n e r a l  c a s e .  
Consider  a  game w i t h  two p l a y e r s  where t h e  s t r a t e g y - s e t  of each  
p l a y e r  is t h e  i n t e r v a l  [ 0 , 1 ]  . The payoff f u n c t i o n s  a r e  t h e n  f u n c t i o n s  
on t h e  s q u a r e  [ 0 , 1 ]  x [ 0 ,1]  , which w e  c a l l  X ; a p o i n t  i n  X is  de- 
noted by ( x l ,  x 2 )  where x  is t h e  j th  p l a y e r ' s  s t r a t e g y  c h o i c e .  j 
For each p o i n t  P  = ( a , b )  R~ , l e t  up b e  t h e  f u n c t i o n  
i . e . ,  up(x ,y )  is t h e  n e g a t i v e  of t h e  s q u a r e  of t h e  d i s t a n c e  from ( x , y )  
2  t o  P . Let  U b e  t h e  set {up : P E R } of a l l  such f u n c t i o n s .  Then 
2  2  U i s  a submanifold  of C (R ) and is i somorphic  a s  a m a n i f o l d  t o  R~ i t s e l f .  
We want t o  examine t h a t  t h e  Nash and e f f i c i e n t  s e t s  of t h e  games where 
each p l a y e r ' s  payoff f u n c t i o n  is s e l e c t e d  from U . A game of t h i s  t y p e  
is determined by a s s i g n i n g  a p o i n t  P  = ( a , b )  t o  p l a y e r  1 and a  p o i n t  
Q = ( c , d )  t o  p l a y e r  2 ,  s o  t h a t  t h e i r  payoff  f u n c t i o n s  a r e  r e s p e c t i v e l y  
up and 
U~ 
. We d e n o t e  t h i s  game t o  b e  (P,Q) . 
To f i n d  t h e  Nash e q u i l i b r i a  o f  t h e  game (P,Q) , n o t e  t h a t  p l a y e r  1's 
b e s t  r e s p o n s e  t o  any s t r a t e g y  c h o i c e  o f  p l a y e r  2  i s  t h e  p o i n t  i n  [ 0 , 1 ]  
c l o s e s t  t o  a  ; t h u s  h i s  b e s t  r e s p o n s e  is a  i f  a € [ 0 , 1 ]  , 0  i f  
a  < 0  , and 1 i f  a  > 1. S i m i l a r l y  p l a y e r  2 ' s  b e s t  r e s p o n s e  t o  any 
s t r a t e g y  c h o i c e  o f  p l a y e r  1 i s  t h e  p o i n t  i n  [ 0 , 1 ]  c l o s e s t  t o  d  . 
I n  t h e  f i g u r e  o n  t h e  l e f t ,  t h e  p o i n t  
(091)  
R is t h e  Nash e q u i l i b r i u m  of t h e  
game (P,Q) . I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  we 
see t h a t  e v e r y  game (P,Q) h a s  a 
u n i q u e  Nash e q u i l i b r i u m .  
To d e s c r i b e  t h e  e f f i c i e n t  set o f  t h e  game (P,Q) , deno ted  by 
E(P,Q) , we need a  d e f i n i t i o n .  Given any  c l o s e d  convex set C 5 R 2  
and a  p o i n t  M E R~ , t h e r e  i s  a  u n i q u e  c l o s e s t  p o i n t  t o  M i n  C . 
We d e n o t e  t h i s  p o i n t  by rC(M) and c a l l  i t  t h e  r e t r a c t i o n  o f  M i n t o  C . 
Thus 
D i s t a n c e  (M, rC(M))  = min ( d i s t a n c e  (M,P)) 
PC c 
and r d e f i n e s  a  c o n t i n u o u s  map of R~ o n t o  C s u c h  t h a t  r C ( P )  = P  C 
i f  P E C .  
2  Lemma 1: For  a l l  P, Q 6 R , E(P,Q) i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  r e t r a c t i o n  i n t o  X 
of t h e  l i n e  segment j o i n i n g  P  and Q . I n  o t h e r  words,  i f  L(P,Q) is 
t h e  l i n e  segment j o i n i n g  P  and Q , t h e n  E(P,Q) = r X ( L ( P , Q ) )  . 
P r o o f :  We l e a v e  t h i s  a s  a  s i m p l e  e x e r c i s e  f o r  t h e  r e a d e r .  Note t h a t  f o r  
a l l  x  X , a p o i n t  y  is a  P a r e t o  improvement o n  x  i f  y  l i e s  on 
t h e  p e r p e n d i c u l a r  drawn from x t o  t h e  l i n e  t h r o u g h  P  and Q . 
Examples: ( i )  i f  P  and Q both  l i e  i n  X , then  E(P,Q) is  L(P,Q) . 
(0 ,1 )  
( i i )  i f  P  and Q l i e  o u t s i d e  of X , then  E(P,Q) may look  l i k e  t h e  
f o l l owi ng  ( t h e  bold l i n e  is E (P, Q) ) : 
I n  t h e  examples ( i )  and ( i i ) ,  t h e  p o i n t  R is  t h e  unique Nash equ i l i b r i um 
and i n  bo th  c a s e s  i t  is  i n e f f i c i e n t .  
Lemma 2:  Let  R be t h e  Nash e q u i l i b r i u m  of t h e  game (P,Q) where 
P  = ( a , b )  and Q = ( c , d )  . Then 
( a )  I f  R does n o t  l i e  on  t h e  boundary of X ( t h a t  i s ,  i f  n e i t h e r  p l a y e r  
is  on a  v e r t e x  of h i s  s t r a t e g y - s e t  a t  R ) ,  t h en  R i s  e f f i c i e n t  i f  
and only i f  a  = c  and /o r  b  = d  . The Nash e q u i l i b r i a  of nearby 
games a r e  g e n e r i c a l l y  i n e f f i c i e n t .  
(b )  I n  t h e  f i g u r e  below, cons ide r  t h e  t h r e e  games (P,Q) , (P I ,  Q1) , 
and (PI', Q") , w i t h  Nash e q u i l i b r i a  R , R1 , and R" r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
I n  t h e s e  t h r e e  c a s e s ,  t h e  Nash e q u i l i b r i u m  is  e f f i c i e n t  and t h e  Nash 
e q u i l i b r i a  of a l l  nearby games remain e f f i c i e n t .  I n  a l l  t h r e e  c a s e s ,  
a t  l e a s t  one p l a y e r  is  a t  a  v e r t e x  and i n  t h e  game ( P I ,  Q1) , t h e  
e f f i c i e n t  set is  reduced t o  a  p o i n t .  
Proof :  This  i s  easy  t o  check u s ing  L e m a  1. 
This  example i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  fo l lowing  main p o i n t s  of t h e  g e n e r a l  
theorem: 
( i )  Nash e q u i l i b r i a  a r e  f i n i t e  i n  number and vary con t inuous ly  i n  u  . 
( i i )  E f f i c i e n t  Nash e q u i l i b r i a  a t  which no p l a y e r  i s  on a  v e r t e x  of h i s  
s t r a t e g y - s e t  a r e  no t  r o b u s t .  
( i i i )  Robust examples e x i s t  of e f f i c i e n t  Nash e q u i l i b r i a  where a t  l e a s t  
one p l a y e r  i s  on a  v e r t e x  of h i s  s t r a t e g y - s e t .  
Note t h a t  t h e  submanifold of f u n c t i o n s  U s a t i s f i e s  c o n d i t i o n  
(T.C. )* ,  a s  is  e a s i l y  checked, and hence t h e  above r e s u l t s  a r e  a  
consequence of t h e  theorem p lu s  remark ( 3 ) .  
4. Mu1 ti-ma trix Games 
These were i n t r o d u c e d  by Nash i n  [ 4 ] .  Each p l a y e r  i h a s  a  f i n i t e  
s e t  Ki of "pure  s t r a t e g i e s f f  which we number f o r  convenience a s  f o l l o w s :  
Each Ki i s  now e n l a r g e d  t o  a  set Xi of "mixed s t r a t e g i e s f f ,  which a r e  
s imply p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  on Ki : 
Ki 
= { x e R  : C x . = l , x  > o } .  
~ C K ~  j 
Ki By R w e  mean t h e  Euc l idean  s p a c e  of dimension ca rd(K. )  whose axes  
1 
a r e  indexed by t h e  e lements  of Ki . W e  i d e n t i f y  Ki w i t h  t h e  set of v e r t i c e s  
of Xi Ki b y a s s o c i a t i n g  j f K w i t h t h e p o i n t  (0  ,..., 0 ,  1 ,  0  ,..., 0) E R . i -
t h  j p l a c e  
Let  K = K1 x . . . ~  K . A mul t i -mat r ix  game i s  s p e c i f i e d  by p a y o f f s :  
n  
1  i 
a  E R~ , . . . , a n  g gK . For any k Q K , a  i s  t h e  payoff  t o  i i f  t h e  k 
1  n  
n - t u p l e  of p u r e  s t r a t e g i e s  g iven  by k a r e  used.  Given a  , . . . , a  w e  
now d e f i n e  t h e  p a y o f f s  II , ,  II on X = X x.. .  1 x Xn a s  t h e  expecta-  n  
a  a  
1  
< 1 ,  x .  1 < 2 i . e . ,  'i i s  an  open set i n  R Ki which c o n t a i n s  t h e  
J 
s implex  Xi . P u t  Z = Z l  x . . .x  Z . For  ~ E R ~  , d e f i n e  II : Z - R  by 
n  a  
where xk denotes  x j (1)  X. . .X  X j ( 4  f o r  k  = j 1 , . . . , j n  . Then 
i i f  a  E R~ is  t h e  payoff of i i n  t h e  p u r e - s t r a t e g y  game, 
' i  r e s t r i c t e d  
a  
t o  X g i v e s  h i s  payoff  i n  i t s  "mixed ex tens ion . "  
To app ly  t h e  Theorem t o  t h i s  c o n t e x t  i t  w i l l  s u f f i c e  t o  check t h a t  
K 
U = {" : a a R 1 s a t i s f i e s  t h e  (T.C.)* c o n d i t i o n  f o r  any z Z . Put  
L = K U ... U K = ( 1  1 , . . . , k ( n )  1 . For  any j € L , l e t  n  
- 
K j = Kl  X.. . X  Ki-l X K x.. .x  K where i i s  such  t h a t  j e Ki . i+l n 
(S ince  L i s  a d i s j o i n t  un ion ,  t h i s  is wel l -de f ined . )  Also f o r  any 
q  = ( ( 1  , ,  t i - 1  1 , ,  n i n  K-j , d e n o t e  t h e  e lement  
( ( 1  , ,  t i - 1  j , 1 , ,  n of K by q ,  . With t h i s  
a  
n o t a t i o n ,  we s e e  t h a t  - ( z ) =  2 z a  where ax j 4 ( q , j )  qe ~ - j  
zq = x . . .x  Z R(i-1) x z R ( i + l )  x...x Z R (n)  f o r  
q  = 1 , . . . , 1 , + l  , . .. , E n ) )  . Take any v  R~ . 
For each j = 1 , . . . , k n  t h e r e  is  c l e a r l y  a  q ( j )  Q K-j such  t h a t  z  
1 
q ( j )  # O . 
Now c o n s i d e r  t h e  p a t h  \ L=O where 
a  
ak o t h e r w i s e  
d Then - ( (Dl7 t )  ( z )  ) = v . This  shows t h a t  U s a t i s f i e s  (T . C  .)* a t  any d t  
a  
K n 
By t h e  Theorem t h e r e  i s  an  open dense  s e t  1 of ( 1 ~ ) ~  3 (R ) such t h a t  




a r e  f i n i t e  i n  number, (b) i f  a n  N . E .  of is  e f f i c i e n t ,  t h e r e  i s  a t  l e a s t  
a  
one p l a y e r  who u se s  a  pu r e  s t r a t e g y ,  (c) i f  an  N.E. of ll i s  s t r o n g ,  
a  
t h e n  a t  most one p l a y e r ' s  s t r a t e g y  is  p o s s i b l y  n o t  pure .  To sharpen  ( c ) ,  
l e t  V2 be  t h e  s u b s e t  of ( u ) ~  g iven  by 
1 " i f  e i t h e r  k  # k' o r  k f k ' )  . 
v2 = { ( a  ,..., an) c ( u j n : a k  f a k l  
V2 i s  open and dense  i n  (u In  . Moreover i f  x  = (xl  , . . . , xn) e X i s  
an N.E .  of ll f o r  a  g V  , and i f  a l l  bu t  one of t h e  p l a y e r s  u s e  pure  
a  2  
s t r a t e g i e s  a t  t h i s  N.E., then  c l e a r l y  s o  does t h e  remainding p l a y e r .  Le t  
Y = V1 n V2 . We have proved 
Theorem (Multi-Matrix) : There i s  an  open dense set V of ( u ) ~  such  
t h a t ,  i f  a E V , 
(a )  t h e  N.E. of ll a r e  f i n i t e  i n  number* 
a 
(b)  i f  an  N.E. of ll i s  e f f i c i e n t ,  t h en  a t  l e a s t  one p l a y e r  uses  a  pure  
a 
s t r a t e g y  
( c )  i f  an  N.E. of ll i s  s t r o n g ,  t hen  each p l a y e r  uses  a  pure  s t r a t e g y .  
a  
5. G e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  
Consider  a  strategy-to-outcome map Q : S - Y , w i t h  p l a y e r  i ' s  
i i 
u t i l i t y  u  de f i ned  on P , and h i s  payoff g iven  by u  ( @ ( s ) )  , ( i = l  ,..., n ) .  
(Our theorem focused on t h e  s p e c i a l  c a s e  when @ is  t h e  i d e n t i t y  map.) 
I f  dim S = dim Y and @ has  f u l l  r ank ,  t hen  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  our  theorem 
cont inues  t o  ho ld  by t h e  same proof .  However, i f  dim S > dim Y t h en  
N(u) w i l l  no l onge r  be  a  f i n i t e  s e t  f o r  g e n e r i c  u  , bu t  i n s t e a d  a f i n i t e  
un ion  of submanifolds  of p o s i t i v e  codimension i n  S . Thus N(u) w i l l  
n o t  " m i s s "  t h e  e f f i c i e n t  s e t  E(u) . But i t  seems probab le  t h a t  ( f o r  a  
g e n e r i c  cho i ce  of u  - and @ ) t h e  two sets N(u) and E(u) w i l l  have 
* 
Fin i teness - - indeed  oddness--of t h e  mixed-strategy N.E. w a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  
by d i f f e r e n t  methods i n  [ 3 ] .  
t r a n s v e r s a l  i n t e r s e c t i o n .  There fore  t h e  e f f i c i e n t  N.E. w i l l  c o n s t i t u t e  
submanifolds  of p o s i t i v e  codimension w i t h i n  t h e  N.E. m a n i f o l d s ,  and t h e  
g e n e r a l  f e a t u r e  of i n e f f i c i e n c y  of N.E. w i l l  s t i l l  b e  main ta ined .  We 
have n o t  worked o u t  t h e  d e t a i l s  of t h i s  p i c t u r e .  
APPENDIX 
We r e c a l l  t h e  r e s u l t s  used i n  t h i s  paper .  
1 
"Let X and Y b e  C1 mani fo lds ,  f  : X - Y a  C map, and W C Y 
a  submanifold .  We s a y  t h a t  f  i s  t r a n s v e r s a l  t o  W a t  a  p o i n t  x  X , 
- -
i n  symbols: f J x  W , i f f y w h e r e  y  = f ( x )  , e i t h e r  y 4  W o r  y e  W and 
(1) t h e  i n v e r s e  image ( ~ ~ f  ( T ~ w )  s p l i t s ,  and 
( 2 )  t h e  image (Txf)(TxX) c o n t a i n s  a c l o s e d  complement t o  T  W 
Y 
i n  T Y .  
Y 
We s a y  f  i s  t r a n s v e r s a l  - t o  W , i n  symbols: f  W , i f f  f &  W f o r  
X 
every  x  E X . 
Let  A , X , and Y b e  cr mani fo lds ,  c ~ ( x , Y )  t h e  s e t  of Cr  
maps from X t o  Y , and p  : A - c'(x,Y) a  map. For a  C A we w r i t e  
pa i n s t e a d  of p ( a )  ; i . e . ,  
'a 
: X - Y is a Cr map. We s a y  p  i s  
a Cr r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i f f  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  map 
g i v e n  by 
f o r  a i A and x X is a C L  map from A x X t o  Y . 
T r a n s v e r s a l  Dens i ty  Theorem. L e t  A , X , Y b e  cr mani fo lds ,  
p  : A -- c ~ ( x , Y )  a  cr r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  W C Y a  submanifold  (no t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  c l o s e d ) ,  and e v  : A x X -- Y t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  map. Define 
P  
$ c A  by 
Assume t h a t :  
(1)  X h a s  f i n i t e  dimension n  and W h a s  f i n i t e  codimension 
( 2 )  A and X a r e  second c o u n t a b l e ;  
( 3 )  r > max(0, n-q) ; 
Then % is  r e s i d u a l  (and hence dense)  i n  A . 
Openness of T r a n s v e r s a l  I n t e r s e c t i o n .  Le t  A  , X , and Y b e  C 1 
1 
mani fo lds  w i t h  X f i n i t e  d imens iona l ,  W C Y  a c l o s e d  C submanifold ,  
1 1 K C X a  compact s u b s e t  of X , and p : A +  C (X,Y) a  C pseudo- 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  Then t h e  s u b s e t  C  A d e f i n e d  by 
%w = {a E A ( P ~ ~ ~  w f o r  x  E K} 
is open. This  h o l d s  even i f  X is n o t  f i n i t e  d imens iona l ,  p rov ided  t h a t  
1 p  is  a C r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . "  
1 For o u r  purposes ,  i t  is  enough t o  n o t e  t h a t  every  C r e p r e s e n t a -  
1 
t i o n  is  a C p s e u d o r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  Also T  W is t h e  t a n g e n t  s p a c e  t o  
Y 
W a t  y  ; T f  : T X - - T  Y is t h e  d e r i v a t i v e  map of f  a t  x  . See [l] 
X X Y 
f o r  d e t a i l e d  d e f i n i t i o n s .  
P a r t  2  ( t h e  q u o t a t i o n ,  w i t h  minor m o d i f i c a t i o n s ,  i s  from [6 ] 
i 
"Let u  : W - R be smooth ( i . e . ,  cr , r b 1 ) f u n c t i o n s  
i = 1 , ,  n  where W i s  a  manifold  i n  some f i n i t e  dimensional  
1 n  Eucl idean space .  Assume t h a t  dim W >, n  throughout .  Consider u  = (u ,..., u  ) , 
n 
u  : W + R . A t  any x c  W , t h e  d e r i v a t i v e  of  u  a t  x  , Du(x) , is  a  
i l i n e a r  map from TxW t o  R" (made up of Du (x) : T W - R , i = 1 , . . . , n)  . 
X 
Propos i t i on .  Given W and u  a s  above, x E W  is an e f f i c i e n t  p o i n t  of 
u  i f f  3 X i 2 0 ,  i = 1 , . . . , n  , n o t  a l l  z e ro  w i t h  
n  
C Xi~u i  (x) = 0  f o r  a l l  x  E TxW ." 
i= 1
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